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ABSTRACT
In this paper we extend the hereditary theory of spin-off formation,
developed by Klepper, by relating the concept of inherited
competence to two different types of spin-offs—university and
private sector spin-offs—and two different types of inherited
competence—R&D competence and innovation competence. We
then utilize this extension of Klepper’s framework to study the
evolution of a science-based industry—the biotech industry. Using
the Irish biotech industry as a case-study, we find that differences
in pre-entry experience manifest themselves most markedly in
terms of the firm’s capacity to attract venture capital, with private
sector spin-offs considerably outperforming university spin-offs.
We argue that the superior performance of the private sector
spin-offs is explained by the nature of their inherited competence
in that they are characterized by higher levels of innovation
competence.
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary approaches to understanding industrial development are increasingly
focussing on the role of spin-off processes. This is partly driven by the work of Klepper
(1997, 2001, 2008), who highlighted the important role of spin-off firms in industrial
development. He developed a theory positing that firm-specific factors such as inherited
competences generate a process through which spin-off firms drive the development of
industries. Firms differ innately in terms of their levels of competence, and the competence
of firms is based on their pre-entry experience. Spin-offs inherit a large part of their
capabilities from their parent, which explains why successful firms tend to give birth to
successful firms (Boschma & Frenken, 2011).
Klepper makes no distinction between different types of spin-offs, focussing mainly on
private sector spin-offs. His ideas have therefore no direct application in relation to a set of
science-based industries where university spin-offs play an important role. Extant research
on university spin-offs suggests that they are different in terms of their competences
(Clarysse & Moray, 2005; Mangematin et al., 2003). In this paper we build on Klepper’s
ideas by relating the concept of inherited competence to the two types of spin-offs—uni-
versity spin-offs and private sector spin-offs. This involves a re-specification of the concept
of inherited competences and new ideas in relation to how these competences are linked to
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spin-off performance. Specifically, we assess whether differences in the pre-entry experi-
ences of firms originating in university and private sector settings influence their sub-
sequent performance.
For the purposes of this analysis, we utilize the Irish biotech industry as a case-study. The
science-driven nature of the biotech industry is well established. The industry has its origins
in university-based research at Stanford University and the University of California in the
1970s where university spin-offs, such as Genentech and Biogen, and private sector spin-
offs played an important role in its development (Prevezer, 2001). Other biotech clusters
developed in, amongst others, Germany, Switzerland and the UK (Cooke, 2007). Interna-
tionally, the biotech industry is characterized by a large number of university spin-offs
(Shane, 2004). The industry has come to be characterized by collaborative research projects
involving both university ‘Centres of Excellence’ and dedicated biotech research firms
(DBFs), the linkages between leading scientists across advisory boards, and the commercia-
lization role of the larger biotech and pharmaceutical firms (Audretsch, 2001; Cooke, 2003).
Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998) argue that this dominant role of science expertise has
meant that in the biotech industry academics have wielded greater technological influence
over firms than has been the case in other industries. Promoting university spin-offs and
university–industry links has become a core pillar of biotech development policies across
the world. The industry has been a beneficiary of government initiatives ranging from
public and public–private financing of start-up firms to risk-sharing and incubation
schemes (Wright, Clarysse, Lockett, and Binks, 2006)
Similarly, the Irish biotech industry’s development over the last two decades has been
greatly influenced by large scale government-funded investment in research in universities
as part of Ireland’s National Development Plan (NDP) and the Strategy for Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation (SSTI), as well as specific policies and supports aimed at commer-
cializing such research through spin-offs. This has led to a significant increase in university
and private sector spin-offs.
We provide a quantitative analysis of the influence of competence inherited via firm
origins on the performance of Irish biotech firms. As noted by Shane and Stuart (2002)
and Clarysse, Wright, and Van de Velde (2011), traditional accounting-based indicators
of performance may be inappropriate for early stage high-tech companies as these com-
panies may initially be loss-making. To overcome this problem, we employ two measures
of firm performance which focus on non-accounting aspects of performance, firm ‘survi-
vability’ and the ability of a given firm to attract venture capital. While survivability is
commonly used as a measure of performance in firm survival studies, recent studies
have questioned the ability of survivability to distinguish between good economic per-
formance and persistent underperformance (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar,
2004; Cefis & Marsili, 2011; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). It is for this reason
that we focus on both firm ‘survivability’ and an additional milestone in the firm’s devel-
opment: the firm’s ability to attract financial resources in the form of venture capital. We
find that the spin-offs do not differ in terms of survivability. Spin-offs do differ in terms of
incidence of attracting venture capital and in terms of amounts of venture capital received,
with private sector spin-offs far outperforming the university spin-offs in terms of
amounts of venture capital.
We argue that the superior performance of the private sector spin-offs is partly related
to the specific type of inherited competence they are endowed with. We characterize
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inherited competence as comprising both the capacity to do R&D, which we refer to as
‘R&D competence’, and the capacity to manage the innovation process, which we refer
to as ‘innovation competence’. The relation between these two types of inherited compe-
tence and firm performance is analysed by means of qualitative research using data com-
piled from interviews with ten biotech spin-off firms and industry experts. We find that
private sector spin-offs are characterized by higher levels of inherited ‘innovation compe-
tence’. We argue that this explains their superior performance, in terms of their capacity to
attract venture capital.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical
ideas related to the role of spin-offs in industry evolution and the link with inherited com-
petences. This is followed, in Section 3, by an outline of the methodology and data sources
used in this paper. Section 4 details the evolution of the Irish biotech industry. The paper
continues, in Section 5, with the quantitative analysis of the relation between spin-off type
and firm performance in the Irish biotech sector and, in Section 6, the qualitative analysis
of the role played by different types of inherited competence. The final section draws out
some conclusions and the main implications for policy.
2. Linking spin-off performance and inherited competence
Approaches to understanding the development of industries are increasingly informed by
evolutionary thinking (Asheim, Cooke, & Martin, 2006). Part of the evolutionary scholar-
ship on industry evolution calls for a focus on the role of spin-off processes (Boschma &
Wenting, 2007; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009). Drawing on Nelson and Winter (1982), the
characterization of industry evolution emphasizes the role of firm-specific routines
within an industry, with ‘fitter’ routines becoming dominant in an industry and eventually
being transferred from the parent to its spin-offs.
An important contribution in this regard has been made by Stephen Klepper, who over
the course of a series of influential papers (Klepper, 1997, 2001, 2008) developed a formal
model of the evolution of industrial concentrations driven by spin-off processes. The
model has been applied to the US tyre industry (Buenstorf & Klepper, 2009) and to
Detroit’s automobile industry and Silicon Valley’s integrated circuits industry (Klepper,
2007, 2010). The theory characterizes industry evolution in terms of organizational repro-
duction and inherited company traits to explain how spin-off firms drive evolution.
Klepper (1997, 2001, 2008) argues that firms differ innately in terms of their levels of
competence, and the competence of firms is based on their pre-entry experience. He ident-
ifies three types of entrants into a new industry based on their pre-entry experience. These
are ‘spin-offs’, which are founded by employees from incumbent firms in the same indus-
try; ‘diversifiers’, which are entrants that diversify from related industries and ‘start-ups’,
which are all other firms, including those founded by capitalists with no experience in the
industry. Klepper argues that, of these firm types, spin-offs will have the highest degree of
competence, based on inherited organizational and industry experience. Spin-offs can
exploit knowledge about the new industry that their founders gained while working in
the industry at their ‘parent’ firms. Start-ups on the other hand are characterized by
low competence, reflecting a lack of organizational and industry experience. Thus a
firm’s pre-entry experience critically shapes its competence, which in turn influences its
competitiveness, its chance of survival and growth, and the rate at which it generates
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further spin-offs. Such spin-off processes are then an important factor in the explanation
of industrial development because spin-offs tend to locate in relative proximity to their
parent firm.
We propose that Klepper’s framework could be refined by distinguishing different types
of inherited competence, namely what we term as ‘R&D competence’ and as ‘innovation
competence’. This nuanced approach to inherited competence is in the spirit of the
Agarwal et al. (2004) distinction between technological know-how and market pioneering
know-how. Klepper loosely defines the concept of organizational knowledge and compe-
tence as a firm’s ‘competence at doing R&D’, its ability to ‘manage the R&D process’
(Klepper, 2008) or its ability to ‘manage technological change’ (Klepper, 2010). We advo-
cate a more nuanced distinction between the competence at managing the narrow R&D
process and the competence at managing the broader innovation process.
The two competences are based on different combinations of knowledge, present in
different intensities. In relation to the types of knowledge, a distinction has been made
between know-why, know-how and know-who knowledge (Asheim, Boschma, &
Cooke, 2011). Know-why knowledge relates to natural systems and the applications of
scientific laws; know-how knowledge relates to knowledge of technical skills and is
often tacit in nature; and know-who knowledge involves knowledge about, for example,
relevant business partners or sources of finance. Van Egeraat, O’Riain, and Kerr (2013)
and Van Egeraat and Curran (2013), based on their work on innovation processes and
knowledge flows in the biotech and animation industries, suggest adding a fourth,
crucial, type of knowledge to the categorization—industry/business knowledge. This
includes knowledge of (unmet) market needs, the ability to connect particular inventions
to market needs, knowledge about bringing products through clinical trials, knowledge of
regulatory procedures, knowledge of raising finance and so forth.
R&D competence involves a high level of know-why and know-how type knowledge,
while know-who and industry/business knowledge play a less important role. The
broader innovation process requires a different combination of knowledge. While
know-why and know-how type knowledge remain important, bringing a new invention
to the market requires know-who and industry/business type knowledge. In the biotech
industry this know-who/industry knowledge is crucial for success (Van Egeraat &
Curran, 2010, 2013). We link this latter knowledge to innovation competence.
Agarwal et al. (2004) in their study of the disk drive industry emphasize the importance
of both technical and market pioneering know-how being passed from parent to spin-off.
Chatterji (2009) in his study of the medical devices industry argues that it is predomi-
nantly non-technical knowledge related to regulatory issues, financing and market oppor-
tunities that generates a performance advantage for spin-offs.
Klepper treats spin-off firms as a homogenous group, focussing mainly on private
sector spin-offs. However, there are clearly different types of spin-offs, potentially with
different characteristics in terms of inherited competence. An important distinction is
that between private sector spin-offs and university spin-offs that tends to play an impor-
tant role in science-based industries.
Extant research on university spin-offs suggests that they are different in terms of their
(level of) competences, at least in the early stages of their development (Clarysse & Moray,
2005; Mangematin et al., 2003). Rasmussen, Mosey, and Wright (2011) highlight the lit-
erature addressing issues such as which competences are necessary for university spin-off
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formation, who provides them and how they are developed. They note that the context of
university spin-offs is distinct from that of corporate spin-offs, as university spin-offs
usually involve the development of a business opportunity based on novel and potentially
disruptive technologies or tacit knowledge emerging from academic research. In addition
to this, university spin-offs face a number of obstacles to their development: they may lack
business and commercial skills (Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004; O’Gorman, Byrne, &
Pandya, 2008); they may lack technical, financial and human resources (Lockett, Siegel,
Wright, & Ensley, 2005); and may not be investor ready (Wright et al., 2006). Rasmussen
et al. (2011), in their study of four university spin-offs in the UK and Norway, find that
while the scientific knowledge of university spin-offs was acquired through the academic
founders, the specific competencies for venture creation had to be developed or acquired.
This paper explores the relation between firm origin, inherited competence and spin-off
performance, distinguishing between the two different types of spin-offs—university and
private sector—and different types of inherited competence—R&D competence and inno-
vation competence. This will be done through the empirical lens of the Irish biotech indus-
try, a science-based industry where university spin-offs are relatively prevalent, alongside
private sector spin-offs and other start-ups.
It is possible to further unpack the link between firm origin and performance by
taking account of the substantial diversity of business models that biotech firms adopt
(Mangematin et al., 2003).1 In this paper we utilize the typology of biotech business
models developed by Bigliardi, Nosella, and Verbano (2005) and Nosella, Petroni, and
Verbano (2005). In a series of studies of the Italian biotech industry, the authors identify
five biotech business models: (i) ‘Dedicated biotech firms’ that carry out R&D activities
(e.g. discovery and pre-clinical development stages) and then licence their outputs to
other firms; (ii) ‘Integrated firms’ that have strong product pipelines and operate across
the value chain (from R&D to manufacture and commercialization); (iii) ‘Manufacturing
firms’, whose activities are based on research of other companies. These firms focus on the
later stages of the innovative process by carrying out engineering, production and com-
mercialization activities; (iv) ‘Biotech suppliers’, who carry out the industrial development
and customized production of biotech products for other firms, that is, they supply
biotechnologies that are used in the production process; (v) ‘Services firms’ providing
research services, such as diagnostic tests, chemical synthesis, studies of cloning, and
sequencing for other drug-orientated companies.
3. Data sources
The focus of the research is the modern (post-genetic engineering era) biotech industry.
For the purposes of this paper, modern biotech is defined as per OECD (2006), which
employs a list based definition that includes various techniques and activities: synthesis,
manipulation or sequencing of DNA, RNA or protein; cell and tissue culture and engin-
eering; vaccines and immune stimulants; embryo manipulation; fermentation; using
plants for cleanup of toxic wastes; gene therapy; bioinformatics, including the construction
of databases; and nanobiotechnology.
The population of firms in the modern biotech industry in Ireland has been established
using existing survey material available from the ‘Biotechnology Ireland’ website (hosted
by Enterprise Ireland, a government industrial development agency). This material was
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updated based on information available from the ‘Financial analysis made easy (FAME)’
database,2 interviews with industry experts (see below), and extensive Internet search of
official company websites and media sources. The set of firms has been back dated to
1994 based on information contained in the ‘Irish Biotechnology Sourcebook’ (1994,
1997). The resulting dataset contains information on the origins of each firm and, in
the case of spin-off firms, identifies whether such firms emerged from existing private
firms or universities. In addition, it contains data on firm exit and acquisition. The activi-
ties of firms have also been detailed, allowing for firms to be categorized in terms of their
business models as per Bigliardi et al. (2005) and Nosella et al. (2005).
In relation to the identification of spin-off firms in the dataset, it should be noted that
multiple definitions exist for the term spin-off (for a discussion see Myint, Vyakarnam, &
New, 2005). We apply a broad definition that covers a wide range of firms, including: (1)
firms started as the result of a mother-organization splitting off existing units or depart-
ments and the mother company holding (at least initially) equity stakes in the new firm
and (2) firms formed by employees or groups of employees leaving an existing organiz-
ation to form an independent start-up firm. The parent entity can be a firm, a university,
or other organization. The second subset refers to those spin-offs formed where the
employees received some form of assistance/support/stimulation from the parent organ-
ization or if they are based on intellectual property/core capability developed during the
employees’ stay at the parent organization.
Firm-level venture capital data for Irish biotech companies was obtained from the Irish
Venture Capital Association (IVCA) (www.ivca.ie) for the period 2007–2012. This venture
capital data was extended back to 1994 (expressed in constant 2010 euro)3 using the Irish
Times archive (a leading Irish newspaper). Qualitative data on the different types of
knowledge and competence possessed by spin-off firms within the Irish biotech industry
was collected via semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted with actors in 10
biotech spin-off firms, 2 venture capital firms, industrial development agencies and with
other industry experts.
4. Evolution of the Irish biotech industry
The biotech industry in Ireland is made up of a foreign and an indigenous segment. The
foreign-owned companies have a strong manufacturing focus and the two segments have
separate evolutionary paths. This section focusses on the indigenous segment. The devel-
opment of the industry took off in earnest in the 1990s. Along with the formation of start-
up firms, spin-off processes play an important role from an early stage. Figure 1 illustrates
the chronology of spin-offs entry and exit over the period 1994–2008. Private sector
spin-offs begin to enter from the early 1990s while university spin-offs enter from the
mid-1990s. The remainder of this section discusses the dynamics of the two types of
spin-offs in more detail.
Elan Corporation, one of the first private sector start-ups established in 1969, was
initially a specialist in drug delivery systems, providing drug absorption control technol-
ogy for antibiotics produced by other global pharmaceutical companies. By the 1990s
Elan’s interests extended into the area of neuroscience and the company subsequently
undertook the development of its own products for the treatment of Alzheimer’s
disease, Parkinson’s disease and multiple sclerosis. To facilitate this product development,
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Elan embarked on an aggressive acquisitions strategy. At the same time, Elan began build-
ing a web of strategic partnerships, acquiring minority stakes in a number of companies
that in turn paid the company licensing fees for its technology. However, Elan’s stock
market value collapsed in 2002 after the US Securities and Exchange Commission
launched an investigation into the company’s accounting practices. Elan responded by
implementing a recovery plan which involved the divesting of a number of subsidiaries
and licences in an effort to drive down debt (Irish Times, 29 October 2010).
This divesture of biotech assets, accompanied by the departure of a substantial number
of executives and scientists from Elan’s Irish operations, has led to the emergence of a wave
of Irish biotech firms that were either spun off from Elan or formed by former Elan staff.
During the two-year period between 2002 and 2004 alone, eight firms were spun off and
another three firms followed between 2005 and 2008. Elan’s divestiture of biotech assets
and product rights, as well as the dispersion of former Elan executives and researchers
throughout the Irish biotech industry, fundamentally changed the trajectory of the Irish
biotech industry. Prior to its restructuring, Elan was characterized by industry analysts
as being ‘hermetically sealed from the rest of Ireland’s indigenous life sciences industry’
and as operating ‘on a different plane compared to the small-scale, undercapitalized ven-
tures that otherwise constituted the sector’ (Sheridan, 2008).
In parallel with the wave of Elan spin-offs, since the mid-1990s Ireland has witnessed a
strong increase in university spin-offs. This development should be seen in the context of
substantial public sector investment over the last 10 years which has significantly
enhanced the biotech research performance of Irish universities. This funding injection
has been timely, given the changing organization of the global biotech industry in the
post-genome era and the enhanced opportunities for small-scale university spin-offs
and dedicated biotech firms to explore new avenues of research, into which larger inte-
grated firms are unable or unwilling to allocate resources. In 1998 the Irish government
launched the Programme for Research in the Third-Level Institutions (PRTLI) and
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI), which since its inception has invested €865 million
(including exchequer and private matching funds) into strengthening national research
capabilities via investment in human and physical infrastructure.4 A biotech-related
Figure 1. Entry and exit of university spin-offs (left) and private sector spin-offs (right), 1994–2012.
Note: Exits denoted by light shaded bars; entrants denoted by dark shaded bars.
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example of this public sector funding is the SFI’s recent investment of €10 million in the
Regenerative Medicine Institute (REMEDI) based in National University of Ireland
Galway (Ahlstrom, 2010).
A further effort, aimed at cultivating university–industry linkages, has been the estab-
lishment of seven Centres for Science, Engineering and Technology (CSET). The process
of technology transfer within Irish universities has also evolved over the last decade.
According to Geoghegan and Pontikakis (2008), a significant empowerment of Technol-
ogy Transfer Offices of the Irish universities has occurred over the last decade, in tandem
with a rapid realignment of university research activities. Many of these programmes were
accompanied by specific policy measures aimed at commercializing the research output,
with a big role for Enterprise Ireland, the national agency with responsibility for promot-
ing indigenous enterprise.
Over a 20-year period, these developments have led to a substantial indigenous biotech
industry. Our inventorization of the development of the modern biotech industry has
identified the presence of 106 indigenous Irish biotech firms over the last 2 decades. Of
these firms, 64 are currently in operation, a further 23 have been acquired, and 19 have
ceased operations. On basis of firm-level data available from the FAME database and
reports from industry experts we estimate that the indigenous firms and those initially
indigenous firms that have since been acquired employed just under 3000 persons in
20095.
University spin-offs account for 34% of total number of indigenous firms while private
sector spin-offs account for 28%. Private sector start-ups, as defined by Klepper (2008),
account for the remaining 38% of firms.6 The majority of university spin-offs are
micro-enterprises, employing less than 10 staff. Private sector spin-offs tend to be larger
employing 42 staff on average. As a consequence, the university spin-offs account for
only 10% of biotech employment while private sector spin-offs account for 46%. The
remaining 44% is employed in private sector start-ups Table 1.
5. Findings: the relation between spin-off origin and firm performance
In the quantitative analysis of Irish biotech industry that follows, we employ two measures
of firm performance: firm ‘survivability’ and a firm’s ability to attract venture capital.
5.1. Survivability of Irish biotech firms
Survival analysis, an established quantitative tool for analyzing industry evolution and
firm performance, is predicated on the idea that firms with greater competence will
increase the competitive pressure within an industry leading to the failure of firms with
Table 1. Irish biotech sector firm and employment distribution.
Biotech firm breakdown (%) Biotech employment (%) Avg. firm size (no. of employees)
Spin-offs:
University spin-offs 34 10 9
Private spin-offs 28 46 42
Private Sector start-ups 38 44 43
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the ‘FAME’ database and information from industry experts.
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lower levels of competence. Firm survival rates can be modelled using an event history
analysis. Survival analysis has become an established quantitative tool for analyzing indus-
try evolution. Survival analysis has been employed in studies of the British, USA and
German automobile industries (Boschma & Wenting, 2007; Cantner, Dressler, &
Krüger, 2006; Klepper, 2002), the German laser industry (Buenstorf, 2007), the Dutch
banking industry (Boschma & Ledder, 2010) and the Danish wind turbine industry
(Menzel & Kammer, 2012) amongst others. The duration of the survival analyses varies
greatly, spanning 143 years in the study of Boschma and Ledder (2010), 40 years in Buen-
storf and Klepper (2009), 34 years in Menzel and Kammer’s (2012) study, and just 4 years
in Carree’s (2003) hazard analysis of Russian commercial banks over the 1994–1997
period. The duration in the present study spans 18 years, from 1994 to 2012. The start
date of 1994 is justified on the grounds that at this time the modern biotech industry in
Ireland was still in its infancy.
We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). The basic specification can
be written as:“^tp”12pt“^tb”6pt
ht = h0(t) eXb
The partial likelihood method is used to estimate the slope parameters in the β vector.
Partial likelihood focusses on the ordering of events—in this case the failure (exit) of a firm
—and calculates the conditional probability of failure for the observation that is actually
observed to fail. The Cox proportional hazard model is known to not necessitate any
assumptions about the distribution of survival rates (the functional form of the baseline
hazard). As per Wennberg, Wiklund, and Wright (2011), we use Stata’s exactp option
to adjust for multiple firms exiting in the same year.
The dependent variable is the survival time of the firm, that is, the number of years for
which the firm exists, with 1994 taken as the starting point. Firms that still exist in 2012
and those that were acquired are right censored, which means that these firms are removed
from the population at that date (2012, or the date of acquisition) but are included in the
analysis prior this date. So, for the purposes of our analysis, acquisition is not deemed to be
an exit. The analysis includes variables on type of spin-off (university spin-off and private
sector spin-off), with private sector start-ups being the reference category or benchmark in
the analysis. The inclusion of dummy variables distinguishing between academic and
private sector origins of firms finds precedence in Buenstorf (2007). As noted above,
the time period for this analysis is 1994–2012, and a dummy variable (D_post-2000) is
included to control for spin-off entry over the period 2000–2012, as this period yielded
substantially more spin-offs than 1994–1999.
Table 2 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard analysis for the Irish biotech
industry. Results are presented as hazard ratios, which can be interpreted as survival prob-
ability relative to the reference variable. From Table 2 it is clear that university spin-offs are
over three times more likely to fail (exit) than the reference group, private sector start-ups
(hazard ratio: 3.410). Similarly, private sector spin-offs are also over three times more
likely to fail than private sector start-ups, (hazard ratio: 3.562). As indicated by the
hazard ratio of less than one, firms entering the industry from the year 2000 onwards
are less likely to fail than firms that entered prior to 2000 (hazard ratio: 0.297). Estimated
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hazard ratios and corresponding coefficients for university spin-offs and private sector
start-ups are significant at the 10% level.
Our survival analysis of Irish Biotech firms points to university spin-offs and private
sector spin-offs displaying similar survival rates. However, there are limitations inherent
in survival studies, due to the assumption that survival and good economic performance
are equivalent (Agarwal et al., 2004, p. 518). Firm survival may not be solely determined by
performance. Underperforming firms may persist for significant periods of time, due to
entrepreneurs adhering to varying firm-specific performance thresholds influenced by
the potential switching costs they would face, the value of capital in alternative uses,
and non-income benefits derived from retaining an underperforming business as a
going concern (Cefis & Marsili, 2011; Gimeno et al., 1997). In light of these questions
over the suitability of survival rates as a measure of firm performance, the next section pre-
sents one further performance measure: the ability of a given firm to attract financial
resources in the form of venture capital.
5.2. Venture capital attracted by Irish biotech firms
We now consider the ability of biotech firms to attract venture capital.7 The Irish biotech
industry’s development in recent years has been greatly shaped by the availability of
venture capital funding. Total venture capital investment in Ireland has more than
doubled since 2002, while the Irish proportion of venture capital secured by the Irish
biotech industry has also experienced a marked increase since 2002. Despite a more
restrictive funding environment in recent years, venture capital funding for Irish compa-
nies appears to have remained resilient, increasing by 19% between 2007 and 2012. In 2002
the biotech industry received slightly less than 2% of total Irish venture capital investment,
rising to 31% in 2009, but falling back to 2002 levels by 2012 as software services and cloud
computing firms began to attract increasing shares of venture capital (IVCA 2007–2012;
PWC 2005).
For the purposes of our analysis, we consider first the probability of firms of different
origin attracting venture capital. A cross-sectional Probit regression is utilized for this
purpose, in which the dependent variable (venture capital inflow) is a binary variable
taking a value of 1 if a company has attracted venture capital to 2012, and 0 otherwise.
Table 2. Survival analysis of Irish biotech firms, 1994–2012.
Dependent variable: timing of exit
Hazard ratio
University spin-off 3.410*
(2.381)
Private spin-off 3.562*
(2.468)
D_post-2000 0.297**
(0.152)
No. of subjects 106
No. of failures 19
Log-likelihood −66.06
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. The reference variable is other private start-up firms.
*denote significance at the .10 level.
**denote significance at the .05 level.
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The variables university spin-off and private spin-off are binary variables indicating the
origin of the firm, with private sector start-ups (as defined in Section 2) serving as the
reference variable. The intensity of venture capital inflows is then considered in specifica-
tions (3) and (4) by means of a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
with the dependent variable consisting of log transformed venture capital inflows.
However, in specifications (3) and (4) only the subset of firms that received venture
capital are considered (40 of the 106 firms in the dataset).
From the results presented in Table 3 it can be seen that university spin-offs have a
higher probability of incidence of venture capital funding (regression specifications 1
and 2). However, of those firms which attract venture capital funding, it is private
sector spin-off firms that receive greater quantities of venture capital, with the statistically
significant PSO estimated coefficient almost three times greater than the insignificant USO
estimated coefficient (regression specification 3). Our findings appear to be at variance
with the findings of Munari and Toschi (2011), who in the context of the micro- and nano-
technology sector in the UK, find no evidence of a venture capital bias against investment
in academic spin-offs. Apart from the different sectoral context, the contrasting results
may also stem from the indicators applied. In Munari and Toschi (2011), the ability of
spin-offs to attract venture capital is measured by the incidence of venture capital invest-
ment, irrespective of the size of the investment. However, in our study, ability to attract
venture capital is measured both by the incidence and by the size of the actual investment.
Table 3. Regression analysis of the Irish biotech industry venture capital inflows.
Dependent variable: venture capital
inflow (probit)
Dependent variable: venture
capital inflow, logged (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −1.147***
(0.276)
−0.912***
(0.228)
6.235***
(0.593)
6.714***
(0.464)
cohort_2000 0.744**
(0.269)
0.817***
(0.277)
1.135**
(0.483)
0.812
(0.505)
University Spin-off 0.949***
(0.326)
0.657
(0.605)
Private Spin-off 0.210
(0.347)
1.716**
(0.688)
USO_DBF 0.789**
(0.338)
0.565
(0.500)
PSO_Integ 0.498
(0.438)
1.287*
(0.702)
PSO_Manu 0.504
(0.588)
2.533**
(0.883)
PSO_Services −1.043**
(0.527)
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.18
Log-likelihood −59.88 −57.34
LR chi2 20.74*** 25.83***
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.24
F statistic 4.40** 3.48**
Observations 106 106 40 40
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
*denote significance at the .10 level.
**denote significance at the .05 level.
***denote significance at the .01 level.
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It is possible to further unpack the link between firm origin and performance by taking
account of the substantial diversity of business models that biotech firms adopt (Mange-
matin et al., 2003). For this we utilize the typology of biotech business models developed
by Bigliardi et al. (2005) and Nosella et al. (2005), as outlined in Section 2. Table 4 and the
corresponding Pearson statistic indicate that private sector and university spin-offs differ
in terms of the activities they undertake in the biotech industry. University spin-offs tend
to function primarily as either DBFs or biotech service providers, while private sector spin-
off firms are more distributed over the Services, Manufacturing and Integrated categories.
In Table 3, the business model categories are introduced as interaction variables. The
binary dummy variablesUSO_DBF, PSO_Integ, PSO_Manu and PSO_Services denote uni-
versity spin-offs which operate as DBFs and private sector spin-offs which operate as inte-
grated firms, manufacturers, and biotech service providers, respectively.
The data show that it is university spin-offs that operate as DBFs that have a higher
probability securing venture capital funding (specification 2). However, if we consider
the amount of venture capital secured (specification 4), we find that private sector spin-
offs which acquire or licence biotech intellectual property for products which they then
manufacture (PSO_Manu) are particularly successful in acquiring venture capital. The
PSO_Manu estimated coefficient is almost twice that of private sector firms who adopt
integrated business models (PSO_Integ). A more detailed disaggregation of the underlying
venture capital data by firm origin (see Table A1 in the Appendix) indicates that these
results are driven by those private sector spin-offs which originated from Elan. Over
the period 1994–2012 Elan spin-offs attracted 60% of biotech venture capital inflows—
twice as much as that of university spin-offs.
6. Findings: inherited competence in the Irish biotech industry
The quantitative analysis of biotech firm performance of the preceding section has indi-
cated that the relation between spin-off origin and firm performance manifests itself
most markedly in terms of the firm’s capacity to attract external investment. In this
respect, a sub-group of private sector spin-offs far outperform the university spin-offs
and private sector start-up firms. We now link spin-off performance and firm origin in
the biotech sector more directly to the different types of inherited competence. As outlined
in Section 2, we posit that inherited competence relates both to the capacity to undertake
R&D, which we refer to as ‘R&D competence’, and the capacity to manage the innovation
process, which we refer to as ‘innovation competence’. We explore the role played by these
distinct competences in the Irish biotech industry by means of data compiled from inter-
views with actors involved in university and private sector spin-offs and other industry
experts.
Table 4. Firm type, broken down by business model.
DBF Integrated Manufacturing Services Total
University spin-off 24 (62%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 14 (36%) 39 (100%)
Private spin-off 2 (6%) 11 (34%) 6 (19%) 13 (41%) 32 (100%)
Private start-up 5 (14%) 9 (26%) 8 (23%) 13 (37%) 35 (100%)
Total 31 20 15 40 106
Note: Pearson chi2=38.3421. P-value (probability of independence)=.000.
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We contend that the difference in ability to attract venture capital reflects differences in
inherited organizational competence. From our interview data we find that university
spin-offs are typically founded, managed and directed by the university professor(s)
responsible for the invention/patent that lies at the basis of the new firm formation. Gen-
erally these academics have a large amount of know-why and know-how knowledge, sup-
porting narrowly defined R&D competence. However, in general, ‘innovation’
competence, based on know-who and industry/business knowledge, is less developed.
This knowledge is crucial for success in the biotech industry and a lack of it tends to
impede performance in the university spin-offs.
The barrier to entry in our industry is not the technology, it is the regulatory environment.
And the universities have no […] familiarity or finesse with the Food and Drug Association.
[…] The academics are there to create innovation, not to exploit innovation. (Interview,
venture capital firm)
In spite of the often promising patents, many of these university spin-offs are slow to
develop and are unable to attract the required finance. According to the industry partici-
pants we have interviewed, many university spin-offs do not develop beyond the initial
start-up stage and end up being wound-up or continue in a dormant form.
The classic case is for a scientist or a post-grad to set up a campus company and then the
problem for [the industrial development agency] is to get those companies off the campus
and into some sort of a situation where they are taking rational decisions. Because very
often these become life-style companies which are a kind of a hobby for a university pro-
fessor. So, most funding agencies and certainly VCs would not fund these technical
people. (Interview, former director industrial promotion agency)
‘Firm A’, although certainly not a failed university spin-off, neatly illustrates a number of
these issues. The company was established in the mid-1990s by two university professors
and three of their Ph.D. students to exploit the research output of the Department of Gen-
etics. These five academics formed the core management team. One of the Ph.D. students
discontinued his studies to act as CEO, with responsibility for international marketing and
business development. The two university professors retained their university position,
and their day-to-day involvement in the company was quite limited after the initial estab-
lishment of the company. The management team inherited absolutely no commercial
competence. This proved to be a handicap.
The principal barrier to our success has not been the technology, it has been the market. It
has been the deployment of the technology within the market. […] The key to doing that is
trying to understand the market better, how the market operates. […] I guess we had to learn
a lot about the market. So this was a steep learning curve, in terms of trying to understand
how this technology could add value in a market place, and that required what were essen-
tially scientists to key into a more fundamental understanding of the environment of trade.
[…] No one really knew how to handle this market. […] The market understanding has come
retrospectively. […] In the earlier days we didn’t have that [business knowledge] and argu-
ably, had we had that, we could have gone faster. (Interview, Firm A)
At the time of the interviews the company was over ten years in business, still in the devel-
opment phase, and ‘not hugely profitable’. The company had recognized the lack of inno-
vation competence as an issue and had begun to bring people with a business background
into the company. The company also established a business advisory board that included
industry experts in various sectors and from different geographies to provide market
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innovation related advice. And ‘even in the last three or four months we have had to get
new frame shifts. We are looking at […] what I call market innovation, as opposed to tech-
nological innovation’ (Interview, Firm A).
‘Firm B’, although arguably the most successful university spin-off company in the Irish
biotech industry, is of interest because it illustrates how university spin-offs can overcome
the lack of inherited industry/business knowledge and inherited competence. This drug
development company was founded in 2004 as a university spin-off. However, the
actual entrepreneurial drive and business acumen came from the private sector. In
2003, an Australian biotech serial entrepreneur contacted an Irish industrial promotion
agency with the idea of commercializing unexploited innovative projects or intellectual
property in Ireland. He was introduced to three professors at an Irish university which
possessed complementary intellectual property. It was decided to establish a company
focussing on developing new drug candidates exploiting the existing intellectual prop-
erty, with the Australian entrepreneur acting as CEO. It was this entrepreneur that
pulled all the business and clinical plans together and secured the initial funding in
2004. Other than being on the board of directors and providing advice, the three founding
professors had no line-management role in the company. The experiences of Firms A and
B neatly illustrates the dichotomy between R&D and innovation competences, the deficit
of the latter that can exist within university spin-offs, and the recognition within these uni-
versity spin-offs that this deficit must addressed in order to facilitate further development.
The interview data compiled for this study identifies private sector spin-offs, notably
the Elan spin-offs, as having inherited strong technical R&D competence, as well as a
rich know-who and industry/business knowledge, which has formed the basis of their
innovation competence. In fact, in some cases the technical R&D competence appears
of secondary importance to innovation competence. This is because a substantial
number of these spin-offs operate as ‘hollow companies’ from an R&D perspective.
They have a limited internal R&D infrastructure and focus on commercializing R&D,
rather than on performing R&D.
Can I tell you about Ireland’s dirty little secret? We have some very successful companies.
While they are Irish companies, the vast majority of their employees are in the US—sales
forces. They buy-in innovation and they resell it. […] Many companies are virtual. […]
They use the different biotechnology companies and service providers and their job is ‘Lego-
land’, putting pieces of Lego together… creating value. (Interview, venture capital firm)
A good example of both the importance of inherited innovation competence for private
sector spin-offs and the workings of a hollow business model is ‘Firm C’, founded in
2003 by a group of former Elan executives. The CEO held a number of senior management
positions with Elan, including VP of R&D, where he successfully directed the development
and regulatory approval of a number of projects. ‘Firm C’, employing four staff in 2010,
operates a 100% outsourcing model. The company adapts molecular entities for the treat-
ment of gastrointestinal conditions. It acquires promising patents from external sources
and brings these through clinical trials. In this the company benefits strongly from the
innovation competence inherited from Elan and embodied in the CEO. The narrower
R&D competence is less relevant to the company since all R&D, analytical services and
clinical trial activity is outsourced. ‘They are not fermenting, cloning, purifying, develop-
ing cell cultures. They take entities from the clinic and put them through clinical trials and
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bring them to the market. [They] are not involved in research. They are much cleverer
than that’ (Interview, Irish Bio-industries Association).
Another example of inherited innovation competence combined with a hollow business
model which emerges from our interviews is ‘Firm D’, a specialty bio-pharmaceutical firm.
The company was established in 2005 by three former Elan executives. The company
inherited a large amount of innovation competence. The CEO had a 20-year tenure at
Elan and had most recently been responsible for managing Elan’s group-wide business
and corporate development activities. The other two founders had acted as Vice President
of Finance and Vice President of Strategic Planning at Elan. The management team was
specifically assembled to support the commercial strategy of the company which is to
identify, evaluate, selectively acquire and enhance the value of late stage development and
FDA approved pharmaceutical products. The company only buys in products that are
already approved by the regulatory authorities and conducts no R&D. Apart from the
core management team, most of the employees are involved in sales functions.
Private sector spin-off, ‘Firm E’, portrays a similar importance of innovation compe-
tence, while R&D competence is less relevant. This firm was established in 2004 in the
wake of Elan’s divestment of its Biotechnology Research unit at Trinity College. A
small group of biotech entrepreneurs acquired oral drug delivery patents developed at
Elan Biotechnology Research. The chief executive had a background in toxicology but
was working as vice president at an Irish venture capital company. The Chief Operations
Officer had a 20-year commercial background in business development and marketing at
multinational pharmaceutical companies. Elan’s Head of Product, Technology and
Business Development joined the board of Directors. Apart from acquiring the IP, the
company inherited no R&D competence from Elan and internal R&D competence
appears less central to the firm’s performance. The management team swiftly built up a
team of 25 employees to further develop and exploit the acquired IP. The company oper-
ates a semi-outsourcing model, retaining some in-house R&D capability but outsourcing
important elements of the development activities. For example in the context of the in-vivo
pre-clinical studies, the actual administration of the drugs into the animals was conducted
by a contractor in the USA. In addition, the company contracted out a range of routine
analytical services. Although the company is no longer involved in early stage research,
it is important for the company to have access to knowledge and new developments in
methodologies and techniques. However, for this, the company uses consultancy services
of a professor at one of the local universities. The interview findings relating to Firm C, D
and E, outlined above, highlight the fact that, by virtue of their business models, firms may
decide to refrain entirely from engaging in in-house R&D activities and instead opt to
acquire IP which they can subsequently commercialize via the firm’s own innovation
competence.
7. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we applied Klepper’s (1997, 2001, 2008) ideas in relation to firm origin,
inherited competence and spin-off performance to a science-based industry, the biotech
industry in Ireland. In the process we extended his theoretical framework by relating
the concept of inherited competence to two different types of spin-offs—university and
private sector spin-offs—and two different types of inherited competence—R&D
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competence and innovation competence. The extended framework proved fruitful in
explaining the evolution of the Irish biotech industry and the diverging levels of perform-
ance of different types of spin-off firms.
We assessed spin-off performance using two measures: survival rates and ability to
attract venture capital. While university and private sector spin-offs display similar
levels of performance in terms survivability, their performance in terms of the attraction
of venture capital funding differs markedly. University spin-offs have a higher probability
of incidence of venture capital funding. However, of those firms which attract venture
capital funding, it is private sector spin-off firms that receive greater quantities of
venture capital. In this respect, private sector spin-offs considerably outperform university
spin-offs. In further support of Klepper, we see that in the Irish biotech industry a high
competence parent (Elan) has borne high competence spin-offs, as indicated by the
flow of venture capital in the industry.
We further explored the link between firm origin and performance by including
business model into the analysis. This showed that, although university spin-offs operating
as dedicated research firms enjoy a significantly higher probability of the incidence of
venture capital, when the actual size of venture capital inflows are taken into account
the private sector spin-offs adopting a manufacturing or integrated business model are
performing significantly better. While categorizations of spin-off type or business model
inevitably involves a simplification of what are complex phenomena, the analysis under-
taken in this paper highlights the importance of distinguishing between distinct spin-off
origins in order to understand subsequent spin-off performance.
With the qualitative analysis of interview data we linked spin-off performance and firm
origin in the biotech industry more directly to the different types of inherited competence
—R&D competence and innovation competence. This analysis suggests that private sector
spin-offs and university sector spin-offs in the Irish biotech industry have inherited differ-
ent levels of innovation competence. The high level of innovation competence of the
private sector spin-offs plays an important role in their relative performance levels.
These findings have a number of implications for industrial policy in the context of the
science-based industry. Recent policy in Ireland and elsewhere has been characterized by a
strong focus on stimulating university spin-offs. The formative role of private sector spin-
offs in industry evolution suggests that policymakers should at least pay as much attention
to stimulating private sector spin-offs as to university spin-offs, and should be mindful of
the proportion of industrial promotion agencies’ resources that are directed to each of
these cohorts. Government agencies should leverage the role of private sector spin-off pro-
cesses and specifically, within that, the role of high competence parents such as Elan.
Of course, that is not to say that investment in the science base and the promotion of
university spin-offs is counterproductive. The literature provides examples where univer-
sity spin-offs are playing an important role in industrial development and cluster for-
mation. Rather, we are arguing for a greater focus on the commercial aspects of
innovation in the science and industrial development promotion efforts of the state and
its development agencies. For example, it seems prudent to include people with strong
business and industry knowledge and innovation competence in the management team
of university spin-offs at the earliest possible stage. This may need to be at a more
hands-on level within the university spin-off than the current practice of including a
person with business expertise on the board of directors. We concur with Rasmussen
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et al. (2011) that a greater focus should be placed on identifying which actors can provide
university spin-offs with specific competencies, such as articulation of business concepts,
development and acquisition of resources to build a new venture, and the leadership role
to sustain the venture as well as understanding how these competencies can be developed
over time.
Notes
1. The concept of ‘business model’ is defined by Shafer, Smith, and Linder (2005) as ‘a represen-
tation of a firm’s underlying core logic and strategic choices for creating and capturing value
within a value network’, where ‘core logic’ refers to how a firm articulates and makes explicit
key assumption and cause-and-effect relationships and the internal consistency of strategic
choice, while ‘creating and capturing value’ refers to a firm’s ability to do things in way that
differentiate them from their competitors.
2. ‘FAME’ is a database of UK and Irish companies which provides accounts data for 2.8 million
public and private companies. See http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/
National/FAME.aspx.
3. In 1992 the chief financial officer of Trinity Biotech noted that funding for start-up ventures
such as Trinity Biotech was simply not available in Ireland at that time, either from the
banks or from venture capital companies (McGrath, 1992).
4. See www.hea.ie for further details.
5. Employment data for nearly all firms under consideration are available from the FAME dataset.
Where not available, the research relied on the knowledge of industry experts—notably current
and former staff at Enterprise Ireland, the Irish Government agency responsible for supporting
Irish businesses.
6. The focus of this paper is on the inherited competence of spin-off firms. While we differentiate
between two types of spin-offs (those originating from universities and private sector), we do not
distinguish between de novo start-ups and diversifiers and refer to them collectively as ‘private
sector start-ups’.
7. This research considers venture capital from both private and state sources combined.
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Appendix
Table A1. Venture capital inflow by business model.
Venture capital
Firms (€ mill) %
University spin-offs 39 111.64 31.93
DBF 24 88.23 25.23
Integrated 0 0 0.00
Manufacturer 1 0.80 0.23
Services 14 22.61 6.47
Private spin-offs (excluding Elan spin-offs) 21 19.87 5.68
DBF 1 0.00 0.00
Integrated 9 14.25 4.08
Manufacturer 4 5.29 1.51
Services 7 0.32 0.09
Private spin-offs (Elan spin-offs) 11 209.74 59.99
DBF 1 8.58 2.45
Integrated 2 95.09 27.20
Manufacturer 2 106.07 30.34
Services 6 0.00 0.00
Private start-ups 35 8.38 2.40
DBF 5 4.17 1.19
Integrated 9 0.75 0.21
Manufacturer 8 3.46 0.99
Services 13 0.00 0.00
Total 106 349.63 100.00
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